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COMMENTS
EVIDENCE-CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ACCUSED--INQUIRY REGARDING
HOMOSEXUAL ABERRATIONS
United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954.)
In a trial before a federal district court, the defendant, a former
army staff sergeant charged with committing treason while a World
War II prisoner of the Japanese, testified on direct examination that
he had been confined in various United States army hospitals and
stockades for lengthy periods after his release as a prisoner of war,
and that, on several occasions during his confinements, he had been
interrogated regarding his activities while a prisoner of war. On
cross-examination the prosecution was permitted to question defend-
ant extensively to determine whether the reason for his confinements
was suspected homosexuality. On appeal from a conviction of treason,
the court of appeals reversed the judgment, holding that the direct
examination had not "opened the door" to this line of cross-examina-
tion, and that such information was inadmissible to impeach defend-
ant's credibility as a witness.1
In the federal courts, and in a substantial majority of state courts,
the scope of cross-examination, except for impeachment purposes,2
is restricted to the subject matter of the witness' direct testimony.3
Under the usual application of this restrictive rule, however, cross-
examination is not confined to a mere reiteration of the facts testified
to on direct examination, 4 but extends to the qualification or rebuttal
of facts and circumstances disclosed on direct, 5 and to the rebuttal of
1. United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954). The court found
as an additional ground for reversal that the defendant was not tried in the
district in which he was first found, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1952)
when the offense is committeed out of the jurisdiction of any state or federal
judicial district. The court held that defendant was first found in Maryland
and not in New York where his trial was held. Subsequently, the United States
District Court for Maryland dismissed a treason indictment against defendant
on the ground that he had been denied a speedy trial within the meaning 6f the
Sixth Amendment because of the delay occasioned by the Government's improper
choice of venue. United States v. Provoo, 23 U.S.L. Week 2463 (D. Md. March
14, 1955).
2. See text supported by notes 13-20 infra.
3. Philadelphia & T.R.R. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448 (U.S. 1840); United States
v. Bender, 218 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1955); McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 21 (1954); 6
WIGMOR, EVMENCE § 1885 (2) (3d ed. 1940). It is to be noted that neither the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have changed the rule in the federal courts. See Bell v. United States, 185 F.2d
302, 311 (4th Cir. 1950).
In contrast to the majority view, in England and a few of the states a party
may be questioned upon any issue in the case. Moody v. Rowell, 34 Mass. (17
Pick.) 490 (1835); Mask v. State, 32 Miss. 405 (1856); Sands v. Southern Ry.,
108 Tenn. 1, 64 S.W. 478 (1901); Morgan v. Bridges, 2 Stark. 314, 171 Eng.
Rep. 657 (N.P. 1818).
4. Heard v. United States, 255 Fed. 829 (8th Cir. 1919); Stewart v. United
States, 211 Fed. 41 (9th Cir. 1914).
5. Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912); Commerical State Bank v.
Moore, 227 Fed. 19 (8th Cir. 1915).
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inferences supporting the existence of facts and circumstances other
than those directly related in the testimony in chief.
In the principal case the court considered that defendant's testi-
mony, being entirely neutral as to the reason for his confinements,
had created no inference adverse to the prosecution,7 and thus had
not "opened the door" to the course of cross-examination pursued.
The basis for the court's opinion was its prior decision in United
States v. Corrigan," where the doctrine of "opening the door" was
defined as an application of the rule of completeness, which permits
a party against whom part of a document, correspondence or conver-
sation is introduced to bring in the remainder to rebut any adverse
inference created by the partial disclosure- The rule of completeness
is not applicable in the instant case, however, since the rule relates
only to a particular type of proof, consisting of verbal utterances,
either written or oral; here, defendant's testimony consisted merely
of a narration of a series of events.20 The court in the instant case
appears to have imposed its requirement that there be an adverse
inference, before the rule of completeness is applicable, as a limitation
upon the scope of cross-examination. By thus requiring that infer-
ences arising on direct examination be adverse before cross-examina-
tion into them is permitted, the court seems to have limited unduly the
usual rule which permits cross-examination into the subject matter of
the direct and into any inferences created as to matters other than
those directly related in the testimony in chief 21 It is doubtful, how-
ever, whether the requirement of an adverse inference was intended
by the court as a general limitation on the scope of cross-examination.
In future decisions the view adopted in the principal case is likely to be
confined to its particular facts. Since the cross-examination herein
dealt with a highly prejudicial collateral matter, clearly irrelevant to
the issues in the case, the court quite properly felt that the inquiry
should only have been permitted, as a matter of fairness, if the de-
6. United States v. Kendall, 165 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1947); Banning v. United
States, 130 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1942). See Cbnley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 188 At.
350 (1936); Note, 108 A.L.R. 167 (1937).
7. United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 535 (2d Cir. 1954). The trial judge
permitted the cross-examination in the belief that the testimony on direct exami-
nation had created the inference that the defendant's confinements were a result
of investigations by government authorities into his activities while a prisoner of
war.
8. 168 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1948).
9. Id. at 45. See Hayden v. Hoadley, 94 Vt. 345, 111 At. 343 (1920). The
limitation on the application of the rule of completeness which the court adopted
in Uiited States v. Corrigan, i.e., that the partial disclosure of the document,
correspondence or conversation must create an adverse inference, is questionable.
The general rule which conditions the admission of the remainder is that it must
be relevant and explanatory of the part received on direct examination. McCoa-
.MICK, EVIDENCE § 56 (1954); 7 Wim.onE, EVIDENCE § 2113 (3d ed. 1940).
10. The distinction is clearly indicated in 7 *WIGMO=r, EvmNcE § 2094 (3d
ed. 1940).
11. See text supported by notes 3-6 supra.
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fendant's testimony had placed the prosecution in an unfavorable posi-
tion in the eyes of the jury.-
The prosecution in the principal case argued alternatively that, as-
suming that inquiry into the defendant's suspected sexual aberrations
was not opened up by the testimony on direct examination, such in-
quiry was permissible to impeach his credibility. It is well established
that when the defendant in a criminal trial takes the stand his credi-
bility may be impeached in the same manner as the credibility of any
other witness,13 and that cross-examination to impeach credibility is,
of necessity, not restricted to the scope of the subject matter testified
to on direct examination.24 There is considerable confusion among the
courts, however, with regard to the permissibility of cross-examina-
tion into previous acts of misconduct by the witness for the purpose of
impeaching his credibility."s The majority of courts permit cross-
examination of the witness as to specific acts of misconduct, even
though not resulting in a criminal conviction, subject to the discretion
of the trial judge.16 The federal courts, however, have adopted a dif-
ferent attitude. The prevailing view among them is that specific.
acts of misconduct which have not resulted in a conviction for a
felony or crime of moral turpitude are not the proper subject of cross-
examination for impeachment purposes.17 The court in the second
circuit, however, previously had been rather liberal in permitting
cross-examination of a witness about prior misconduct. s By exclud-
12. It would seem that the court, even if it had considered the inquiry to be
within the permissible scope of cross-examination, could have properly reversed
the conviction because of the trial judge's failure to limit the extent of the cross-
examination. The trial judge had permitted the prosecution to pursue its inquiry
into the defendant's sexual deviations for an extremely extended period, covering
over 200 pages in the record. United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 533-534
(2d Cir. 1954). See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931), which
recognizes the trial judge's discretion to curb the extent of cross-examination.
13. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDEN § 890 (3d ed. 1940). The statement is frequently
made that cross-examination into character may be used to show the defendant's
oredibility, but not to show the probability that he committed the crime for which
he was charged. See State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175 (1935), where
the court criticizes the impracticality of this type of distinction.
14. See, e.g., Dickey v. Wagoner, 160 Kan. 216, 160 P.2d 698 (1945); Beck v.
Hood, 185 Pa. 32, 39 Ati. 842 (1898).
15. For an exhaustive analysis of the views adopted in the various jurisdic-
tions, see 3 WIG.%iOR, EVIDENCE § 987 (3d ed. 1940). It is well recognized that
extrinsic evidence regarding prior misconduct is inadmissible. See McCoRmicK,
EvmInDcz § 42 (1954). While most courts are agreed that a witness may be
cross-examined as to a prior conviction, there is considerable difference of opinion,
at least in the state courts, as to what kind of convictions constitute sufficient
grounds for impeachment. See McCoaM CK, EVIDENcE § 43 (1954).
16. People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950); State v. Neal, 222
N.C. 546, 23 S.E.2d 911 (194a); Dungan v. State, 135 Wis. 151, 115 N.W. 350
(1968).
17. Echert v. United States, 188 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Klass, 166 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1948); Campion v. Brooks Transportation Co., 135
F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Ingram v. United States, 106 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1939).
See Walters v. United States, 63 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1933).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Minhoff, 137 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1943); United
States v. Sager, 49 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1931) (witness may be cross-examined on
any previous vicious or criminal act).
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ing the inquiry into defendant's sexual misconduct the court has
added the support of an important federal circuit to the prevailing
federal view. Although no definitive statement is made, the opinion
indicates that the rule adopted is not to be an absolute rule which
excludes all inquiry into acts of misconduct not resulting in a criminal
conviction, but that cross-examination might be permissible for im-
peachment purposes if the misconduct involved were related to the
witness' veracity,19 a view adopted by at least two other circuits. 20
On its facts the result of the principal case appears to be clearly
correct. While the rather cursory treatment of the doctrine of "open-
ing the door" may prove to be more confusing than enlightening, the
court's limitation on cross-examination to impeach credibility is a view
supported by considerations of fairness.21 It would seem that any pro-
bative value on the issue of credibility which evidence of defendant's
past misconduct might possess would be far outweighed by the danger
of so prejudicing the jury as to produce the conviction of an accused,
not because the evidence establishes his commission of the crime
charged, but because of his general unsavory character. To avoid the
risks of obtaining a conviction in this manner, it is submitted that
cross-examination to impeach credibility should be limited to an in-
quiry into past misconduct which pertains to veracity, since only this
type of evidence has probative value on the issue of credibility.
19. See United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1954).
20. Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
694 (1941)-; Coulston v. United States, 51 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1931). See Banning
v. United States, 130 F.2d 330, 337 (6th Cir. 1942).
21. It is to be noted that the leading authorities advocate a narrower scope of
cross-examination into specific acts of misconduct than any of the federal courts
apply. Professor Wigmore apparently would limit the acts inquired into to those
relating to veracity, regardless of whether a conviction had resulted. 3 Wiclx0RE,
EVIDENCE § 982 (3d ed. 1940). The UNIFOr, RULES OF EVIDE;Ncr, Rules 21 and
22(d) (1953), take the position that only conviction of a crime involving "dis-
honesty or false statement" should be admissible to impeach an accused's credi-
bility, and then only after he has introduced evidence supporting his credibility.
The Proposed Missouri Evidence Code takes a position of compromise between
these two views: specific acts of misconduct relating to veracity may be Inquired
into, but if the acts resulted in a criminal conviction they may not be the proper
subject of cross-examination until the accused has brought in evidence to sup-
port his credibility, and then only if they relate to untruth or false statement.
PROPOSE MISSOURI EVIDENCE CODE § 5.10 (1948).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss2/8
